Hermeneutic Heretic

The statement from Ariana Huffington (in bold below) is one of the best examples of the folk theory upon which Critical Discourse Analysis is based - namely that words influence people in certain inevitable ways. It is also a good example of the sources of disaffection witht he mainstream debate experienced by US conservatives as described by Alan Brinkley. Brinkley suggests that the 50s and 60s brought a liberal mindset in which no alternative to post-Roosevelt era view of the world was possible to imagine. And this same sense of inevitability of conclusion from words still permeates the left/right divide; as a result each side views each other as either incompetent or corrupt (if not outright evil) because those are the only possible explanations of why they do not agree. Lakoff explained the source of the difference well in Moral Politics but seems not to have learned his own lesson in later work.

On The Media: Transcript of “HuffPo a Go Go” (June 6, 2008) ARIANNA HUFFINGTON: I really wrote the book not really to catalog what has happened but to understand why, because I think if we’re going to put an end to this dark chapter in American history, we need to understand why.

And you’re absolutely right. The 28 percent of Americans who still approve of George Bush are not going to be in any way influenced by my book. But there is another 20 percent that I do want to appeal to, and that’s the 20 percent of additional Americans who make the 48 percent that are considering voting for John McCain. If that 20 percent reads my book and at the end of it they are still thinking of voting for John McCain, they can have their money back.

BOB GARFIELD: So the answer to my question is that you wrote this book to make sure that John McCain is defeated?

ARIANNA HUFFINGTON: Yes.

Google Reader (1000+) “Democracy means government by discussion, but it is only effective if you can stop people talking.” (Clement Atlee)

There is no doubt that pithy aphorisms are an important instrument in the socialisation toolkit (construction inventory) or any group (from couples, groups of friends to political parties, nations and, these days, humanity). To describe this in a language I understand, they help the group negotiate important framings through the cognitive process of blending. They play a social role (witness the proliferation of books of quotes and RSS feeds or mailing lists with quote a day), socio psychological role (people’s email signatures with quotes) and a personal psychological role (the pure enjoyment experienced upon reading a particularly well-crafted quote, or even a personal transformation if the mappings are properly generalised).

The one by Atlee above is an example of a particularly interesting class of aphorism, one that involves paradox. Quite obviously discussion is impossible without talking, but also an effective government must at some point stop talking and act. Now, I think part of the power of the quote lies in the fact that it doesn’t have a cognitive resolution (just like many other quotes relying on a paradox) but it points to two competing models we have of governance. 1. government needs to discuss things, 2. government needs to act. From a policy standpoint, this is a real dilemma. Each of these models are backed up by socially negotiated stories that have both practical and cognitive resolutions. But our Aristotelian instinct of the excluded middle tells us that they cannot be both true at the same time (or that they simply cannot be both true at all). This usually triggers the next step: folk reductionism (I say ‘folk’ but ’scientific’ reductionism often has similar cognitive and social features). What happens is that we conceptualise one models in terms of the other. That’s where Schonian generative metaphors come into play. We could say something like ‘action is really a kind of discussion’ or ‘discussion is really a kind of action’ and simply describe excessive discussion is bad action (professional English has lots of phrases and other cultural artefacts to support this ‘paralysis by analysis’, ‘design by committee’, Dilbert cartoons, ‘just do it’, etc.) or rash action was the wrong kind of discussion (again the phrases supporting deliberation are there: ‘jump before you leap’, ‘measure twice, cut once’, etc.)

There’s even a whole branch of psychology dealing with learning styles and personality types that maps these differences on different kinds of people. Like with a lot of science, this plays the dual role. On the one hand it reinforces the cultural framings (see multiple intelligences, ‘different folks different strokes’, etc.) but it also contributes to our knowledge of the human condition (what I’d like to call ‘anthropology’). There’s a good chance that different people actually process these models very differently at a very basic socio-cognitive level - rather than just having different opinions. Also, not everyone seems to respond to aphorisms and generative metaphors in the same way. Sure different people arrive at different mappings but there are many people who simply do not derive the same pleasure or benefit from this kind of reasoning as others. Clearly, more research is needed, as always. (BTW: Saying this is another thing in the inventory of constructions availble to us in a discussion like this.)

Colbert I. King - Why Obama Stands With His Church - washingtonpost.com

This history comes to mind as I listen to conservative commentators, chief among them MSNBC’s Pat Buchanan, brand as "racist" the slogan adopted by Trinity United Church of Christ in Chicago: "Unashamedly black and unapologetically Christian."

I am a big supporter (including in print) of political correctness as a means of challenging embedded frames of action but at the same time I’m aware of the processes of entrenchment that will lead to the creation of new frames that will determine much of the public discourse in the future. In other words, political correctness works only for a period of time before it needs a ‘refresh’. The history of the appellations of African Americans is one such great example. Going from African to Negro to Black to African American it is now on its second cycle of such a refresh.

An Barack Obama and Rev Wright seem to be victims of one such particular entrenchment.

I’ve been reading much of the commentary on Obama’s speech and collecting quotes in preparation for a conference paper and I was struck by the incessant claims of Wright’s racism based on remarks that were so obviously taken out of context. This becomes even more obvious when you listen to the whole sermon. How could anyone think of him as anything else but a courageous leader of his community (who may make the occasional questionable but hardly incendiary remark) is almost inconceivable. Yet, commentator after commentator calls him racist or at least considers his remarks racially inflammatory. The quote above suggests a possible explanation. He uses the word ‘black’ in a positive affirmative sense. But political correctness has made a positive identification of someone as black a precarious proposition. There are many contexts in which this is acceptable but many in which it is not.

I’ve worked for an agency that asked its applicants to mark their ethnicity with the option of ‘choose not to disclose’. With few exceptions, the majority of the people making that choice were white upper middle class people with an agenda. Most people of color took it in the spirit in which it was intended: ‘If we are aware of the diversity of our constituency, we can work harder to try to support it.’ If I had a choice I would have asked for sexual and political orientation, too. Sure, in most contexts, none of this should matter, but in others, knowing the make up of one’s constituency, is essential. But when some of my Czech students saw a similar diversity questionnaire in the UK, they thought it was racist.

Another illustration was an example given by a black researcher in education of a white parent who was proud of his daughter for taking the more complicated route of choosing the color of a sweater over the color of the skin in pointing out her friend to him at a distance. But such color blindness is an act (brilliantly satirised by Stephen Colbert) and not a reality. But is this public act of color blindness that is the only way to signal belonging to a certain community of values that is available to the white middle-classes. To them, this leads to a puzzling and discomfiting asymmetry of reference. Calling a Church: ‘Upper East Side White Congregation’ is racist and ‘Harlem Black Church’ is not! Linguistically, this is nothing strange or unusual. Language is full of such asymmetries (see Robin Lakoff’s Language and Woman’s Place for examples about the descriptions of women) some working for the benefit of one group or another and some neutral. But the folk theories and the inventory of reactions available in American public discourse simply does not allow for an easy discussion of this issue.

LII: Constitution To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries;

I had no idea that copyright was part of the US Constitution until I read about this in an LA Times Op-Ed. The article was debating the semantics and metaphors related to filesharing on which I’ll probably have more to think. But, reading the section referenced in the article reminded me of a recent talk I went to on the default states in frames.

And it seems to me beyond much doubt that the framers had assumed a default state of “limited” that meant actually limited rather than potentially limited which is what the current laws enshrine. Of course, there are many other ‘default’ states in the constitution, for instance regarding what a ‘person’ is. But these defaults have been typically reset by amendments.

Also, it could be more than argued that the current copyright regime does not “promote the progress” of anybody but big corporations. What about the company that owns the rights to ‘Happy Birthday’? Where is progress or even the rights of authors and inventors in that?

I’ve been following this debate from a distance for a while but haven’t seen the conflict with the constitutional wording raised. But maybe I’ve just not been looking in the right places or am missing something.

Lakoff in ‘Moral Politics’ talks about how competing models of family influence policy and politics debates in the US. This model duality is not only present in a variety of contexts but I would claim is the very foundation of all policy discourse (argument). In other words, whereever you look at a policy controversy you see a conflict of framings and foregrounding. Here’s a good example I culled from two recent podcasts.

Matt Miller has a radical but simple proposal to improve the nation’s public schools: federalize funding to eliminate disparities in per-pupil funding between poor and affluent communities. He also proposes a single set of federal standards for math, science and reading, instead of letting each state set its own standards. Scott Simon speaks with Miller, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress.
NPR: Plan Would Nationalize Schools to End Disparities

How can government create policies that interact with – rather than police - human behaviour? DAVID WILLETTS, Shadow Secretary for Innovation, Universities and Skills, argues that politicians could learn something from the recent surge in the study of human behaviour by game theorists, evolutionary biologists and neurologists. David Willetts will be delivering the Michael Oakeshott memorial lecture on The Ideas that are Changing Politics on Wednesday 20 February at the London School of Economics.
BBC - Radio 4 - Start the Week

Quite independently, the progressive Matt Miller and conservative David Willetts have provided a great example of retrenchment of two basic models of governance. 1. Local people know best and don’t need interference from removed centrals of power. 2. Local people are ignorant and need central control to make sure they don’t make a mess of things.

These two models are negotiated in a variety of contexts all over the place. They are given ’scholarly’ support and ‘narrative’ support (the two being often just two sides of the same coin) on almost daily basis. We can also think of stories (real or fictional) where one or the other will apply. For instance, teachers talk about the National Curriculum in the UK today or Voter registration drives in the 1960s in the US south. Plus we could probably list several film and TV storylines that playout one or the other scenario with great conviction.

Now, both Willetts and Miller seem to make good points. How do we decide? Negotiation of framing and generative as well as constitutive metaphors.

On The Media I’m not a psychologist, but I think that at some deep level, if the situation you’re living is a lie, and the situation these boys were living was one, and, moreover, at least the father was complicit in some way in the murder of these children’s parents - that situation, I do not believe, can be healthy.

…

Argentina lived under terror. When societies emerge from these states, any society emerging has to balance truth with justice.

And then he had to say this:

Lost Children, Lost Truths - New York Times

But they had the truth, or something closer to it than a peaceful Paraguayan yard reeking of repressed crime. We journalists are intruders who move on. Was this intrusion worth it? For the dead, and for Argentina, I say yes. For the twins, I don’t know.

Truth or justice? Every society emerging from terror must choose. But truth is messier, and justice less adequate than we acknowledge. Life resides in half-tones newspapers render with difficulty, rather than in absolutes.

This folk magical assumption about the elemental and deep-rooted nature of the truth that is so essential that it seeps into our very existence no matter how much we are trying to paint a veneer of ignorance over it.

Cohen is right. He’s no psychologist, but then neither are a lot of psychologists. Truth is like language. When you grow up in the context of a lie, you will speak the lie fluently and the truth will be just as disruptive as the introduction of a new language.

But this is not just a random quirk of an American journalist brought up on cultural reflections of the psychoanalytic therapeutic tradition. This is a demonstration of one folk theory of truth and it is the same one that underlies our myths about science that is most often represented through something called ‘reductionism’.

And as fractals seem to indicate, this will also be part of science’s undoing. Wilson’s failure in Conscillience to understand science (despite his grasp of the humanities) is a great example of this. Another one is Skinner’s reductionism and re-labelling of old problems with new words in Verbal Behavior which was so deftly analysed by Chomsky. And, of course, Chomsky’s own insistence on limiting language description to that which is subject to reduction. And it also pertains to things like the Sokal hoax and the science wars. And it drives the search for the Unified Theory.

The problem is that the folk assumption about the fundamental nature of scientific truth forces scientists into seeking further and further underlying principles in order for it to be scientific. For instance, genes driving all morphological development of an organism. This is a bad model for science and an even worse model for social science.

An insight from fractals and chaos might help us find a better way. (The following is simply a fractal-inspired metaphor). ‘Truths’ exist on levels of magnification. They exist as tendencies that are exact at certain moments but sensitive to initial conditions.

This might allows us to admit that there are certain things social scientists know with just as much certainty as natural philosophers know the laws of physics. Only the numerical outcomes and predictive powers are plotted on attractors rather than linear curves. For instance, we know that depriving a group of people of resources will result in social unrest, and that not all individuals will participate in that unrest. We don’t know what the breaking point is nor do we know what forms the unrest will take but that’s not insignificant knowledge.

Moreover, it’s knowledge similar to the knowledge of scientists. Scientists know a lot about the chemistry and physics of metals but all that knowledge is idealised (as in ideal gasses). To actually build a bridge engineers need lots and lots of manuals with translation tables that provide constants that can be plugged into equations. These constants are empirically established and can change with changing conditions.

Social engineers have history to do the same job but the translation tables have to be publicly negotiated analogy (as I’ve show in many other posts).

The job of the natural and social philosophers, then, should be to seek the right levels of magnification for their knowledge and proceed with extreme caution when finding causal links between layers.

[This is all very sketchy, at the moment, I suspect I will have a more to say about this later.]

BBC - Radio 4 Woman’s Hour -Male Primogeniture Jenni discusses the law of primogeniture with Liberal Democrat MP Lynne Featherstone, who has asked the Equality and Human Rights Commission to investigate the legality of this centuries old practice, and to royal commentator and author Charles Mosley.

BBC - Radio 4 Woman’s Hour -Primogeniture: Should the law be changed? Thirty years since the passage of the Sex Discrimination Act, the law that governs Succession to the Crown in Britain is also based on primogeniture: a male-preference law that dictates the throne should go to a male heir over a female. Why does the law continues to exist and is there a case for changing the law sooner than later?

The really interesting (for this analysis, not for itself) argument in this discussion of male primogeniture was made by Charles Mosley. Several times he presented two ‘logical’ objections (invoking the term logic) 1) "if you’re interested in equality why not prefer the abolishment of monarchy which is even a more startling symbol of inequality?" 2) "if you [Lynne Featherstone] are also a spokesperson for the rights of the young, why not also include a change in the inheritance going to the firstborne?" [my paraphrases] His interlocutor responded by saying "ah, that’s the old chestnut that is often used to stop change".

That fact that they were both justified in their remarks tells us something startling about public debate: logic and rationality cannot be and are not what decides the argument. At least, not in the traditional sense. The traditional view of logic is that it is independent of the matter at hand as well as of the arbiter of correctness and can be therefore used as yardstick of the validity of the argument. That’s why Mr Mosley could sound a bit condescending (even though that could have been by dint of his being the ‘royal’ commentator) when he said something like ‘then it surely follows’ and ‘isn’t it logical’. Mr Featherstones justified objection that this was not a ‘legitimate’ argument did not have nearly as much weight purely because of the high regard we have for logic in these contexts.

Yet, it is ‘obvious’ that in this case the logic is gerrymandered and used as a rhetorical device. But is that always so? There are many times when the ‘logic’ applies.

Basically, the ‘logic’ of any argument needs to be negotiated. And any negotiation will bring with it all the factors that ‘real’ negotiations do. I.e. aspects of power, prestige, location, primacy and recency, ingroup/outgroup concerns, etc. In other words, it is not easy. But it is the only way it can go. This is not a suggestion as to how things should be, merely a description of how things are. There is an open question whether such debates would be more fruitful if both interlocutors were aware that they are engaged in a negotiation and subject to various influences. I’m a bit skeptical on this count but not convinced yet either way.

Let’s have a look at other similar examples.

The right wing’s argument that if you allow gay marriage what’s to stop you from allowing zoophilic unions? Of course, there is nothing that would do that. A perfectly valid modus ponens argument can be constructed to demonstrate this entailment. Yet, intuitively, we know that such a occurrence is very unlikely.

Similarly, an argument can be (and has been) made, that if we stop abortions and outlaw prophylaxis we should also force any young heterosexual couple in an encounter to procreate. For, are they not depriving a potential human life of coming into being by avoiding copulation? Again, logic fails completely. Only negotiation of categories, concepts, and their mappings can bring any results.

Of course, it also works the other way. An fairly undisputably legitimate logic can be overriden by negotiation. The claim against the legalization of marihuana is that it is a gateway drug. Yet, the numbers of people who have smoked marihuana (almost everybody - except, for some reason, me) are so great that if there was any underlying causality significant proportion of the population would be addicted to hard drugs. Yet, that is clearly not the case. Other factors prevailed in the negotiation.

Another example is the British argument against immigration for the reason that ‘Britain is a small island’. First, it is neither small nor comparatively densely populated but most significantly, its being an island doesn’t make its borders any more solid than, say Germany. If, Belgium needs more space to house migrants, surely, they can’t borrow a spare bit of France. Nevertheless, this is a very common argument.

And how about opponents of the smoking ban. It is quite true that smoking does not ’cause’ cancer in the way that a bat causes a person to have their skull smashed in. Nevertheless, it was possible to generate a consensus of causality that overrode the logic. (I’ve heard a similar argument made against evolution.)

And so on, and so on.

But wait! There’s more. Not only is not logic a good tool for independently judging the validity of an argument (although it is a good tool for putting an argument forth), it is not a good predictor of cognitive and social outcomes. And this applies to metaphoric implicature, as well. This is due, again, to the fact that these outcomes are negotiated. This doesn’t bode well for most social commentary and a good chunk of social science.  But that can be explored some other time.

Is It Possible To Be Half-Adopted?  Imagining someone giving away semen or an egg couldn’t possibly feel the same as imagining a parent giving a way a baby. Could it?
The friend who asked whether I consider Mrs. Ramirez to be adopted is adopted herself, something she doesn’t associate with rejection but rather with acceptance, being desired by and accepted into a family.
Sometimes it’s the fault of language, the lack of words yet invented to describe our lives, that makes it difficult to know and explain who and what we are.  Are you a mommy? A second mommy? An other mommy? Are you adopted? Are you biologically adopted?  What it all means to Betsy Ramirez will be up to Betsy herself to discover, to find the words for and to one day explain to her moms.

This is a perfect example of the negotiation of category boundaries. Lakoff in Women, fire and dangerous things spends a whole chapter analyzing the radial category of mother and this is an example of the same analysis happening in ‘nature’. Not much more to say.

Ubuntu: Just how popular is it? - Starry Hope Productions…Ubuntu has managed to gain a large portion of the Linux mind share, at least amongst the tech community.

Wikipedia: Mind share is the amount of attention required by something and the time spent thinking about something. It can also refer to the development of consumer awareness about a specific product or brand in hopes that they will buy the product or brand. One of the main objectives of advertising and promotion is to establish what is called mind share, or share of mind.

There’s an misalignment of concepts here that illustrates nicely the problems of locating collective concepts such as language, culture in the minds of the individuals. On the one hand, there is no doubt that to speak a language or to behave as a recognizable member of a culture, something has to be happening inside the individual (mostly but not exclusively the brain). However, our access to these concepts is mostly through the collective. Even notions such as ‘private language’ whether possible or not (and the theoretical ‘private culture’), are secondary and defined in contrast to their default framings as collective concepts.

It isn’t just a question of access. Theoretically, we could study the individual’s body/brain/mind to get to the bottom of how the collective is represented there. The problem is that this kind of reductionism would deprive us of an important level of description. This is similar to the fractal notion (as I understand it, anyway). It is possible to reduce anything to something else, but an important part of that original something is lost. So basically, when we’re describing the collective by reducing it to the neural or mental, we’re describing something functionally and essentially different than when we’re describing it as a collective phenomenon.

The Starry Hope analysis is particularly interesting because it uses purely collective measures to infer both a collective notion (popularity) and an individual notion (mind share). There are interesting folk theories of mental causality at play here.

On The Media: Transcript of "Not So Innocent" (October 5, 2007) RICHARD HALPERN: Right. There’s often a kind of loss of innocence that takes place in the paintings themselves, which reflect on a potential loss of innocence on the part of the viewer. I think an interesting example of that is Rockwell’s painting called The Art Critic. That’s a painting of a young man, a young art student in a museum, who’s studying a painting on the wall of a kind of amply-endowed Rubenesque lady. And he’s peering at it closely through a magnifying glass, looking at a brooch on the woman’s breast. He doesn’t notice that he’s actually looking at her chest at the same time, but the woman in the painting does notice and leers back at him.

You have a young man, a kind of innocent, who doesn’t see what he’s looking at, but the painting does see. The painting isn’t innocent. And, in a way, that seems to me to spell out the relation between Rockwell’s viewers and the paintings themselves. The viewers may be innocent or may be in a state of denial or disavowal but the paintings themselves are very knowing and sophisticated. And they’re, they’re looking at us, in a way, more intently than we are at them.

There’s a strange certainty about most art and literary criticism. The discourse of the genre dictates that statements about artifacts are to be made in a particular manner that positions the audience into a place of inevitability of perspective. It is the object (painting, book, song…) that always tells of something and shows us something. Sometimes it’s the author, sometimes the audience ‘can’ see something. But it is rarely the critic who has any agency. S/he is always describing what is never what s/he perceives.

The above example of ‘activist’ criticism shows very clearly how the multiple mental spaces set up by the text interact. There is the space of people in the painting, there’s the space of the painting as painting, space of the viewers. Earlier the space of the painter was also established. However, it isn’t always clear which space is being referred to at any particular moment or rather what the boundaries of these spaces are. For instance, in the text in bold it isn’t clear whether the paintings stand metonymically for their author or speak directly of themselves. This indeterminacy of framing is not dissimilar to the indeterminacy that is the hallmark of art itself. Criticism is then a sort of meta-art (art here includes music, drama and literature) and similar standards can be applied to it.

Criticism is only one example of socially ritualized frame negotiation. It doesn’t stand apart from the work, artist, audience or the interaction the work, artist, audience has with the discursive space of the day. Criticism is an integral part of the artistic process at all levels. Creators and audiences take it into account (even if they ignore particular artifacts of criticism) and actively engage in it themselves (reminiscent of folk etymologies). The same applies to the political process, processes of language change. In all these instances, there is a ritualized parallel to the natural frame negotiation that goes on. The extent of how deep this frame negotiation can go is not quite clear yet but it may be guided to a large extent by the availability of given phenomena to introspection (as described well by Len Talmy).